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Abstract 
It has taken two crises—the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis 
of 2007-2009—for the international community to seriously focus on the reform of the 
international financial architecture for crisis prevention, management and resolution. Facing 
the global financial crisis, the international community has responded by making the G20 
Summit the premier forum for international economic and financial cooperation, creating a 
potentially more powerful Financial Stability Board, and augmenting the financial resources 
of the IMF.  
 
However, the international financial architecture remains inadequate for the needs of many 
emerging market economies. The effectiveness of IMF surveillance—particularly that of 
systemically important economies (such as the US, the UK and the Euro Area)—as well as 
its governance structure should be improved. International liquidity support should be made 
available when any country with sound economic and financial management is put into an 
externally driven crisis. International agreements should be reached on external (sovereign) 
debt restructuring, and on the cross-border resolution of insolvent, internationally active 
financial firms for fair burden sharing of losses between creditors and debtors, or among 
different national authorities. 
 
A well-functioning regional financial architecture could complement and strengthen the 
international financial architecture. East Asian authorities should focus on: (i) the 
establishment of resilient national financial systems, including local-currency bond markets; 
(ii) integration of national financial markets to facilitate the mobilization of regional savings 
for regional investment (in infrastructure and SMEs); and (iii) enhancement of regional 
liquidity (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization) and economic surveillance mechanisms. 
The region should also intensify regional exchange rate policy coordination to achieve 
sustained economic growth without creating macroeconomic and financial instability. 
 
 
JEL Classification: F30, F32, F33, F34, F53, F55  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
During the 1990s and the early 2000s, there were at least nine major financial crises in 
emerging market economies,
1 primarily driven by capital account factors as opposed to 
current account problems. These crises were difficult to handle due to their speed, the extent 
of capital flow reversals, and associated contagion. Traumatized by the 1997–1998 crisis, 
Asian policymakers arrived at a consensus view that the then existing international financial 
architecture—the official mechanisms that facilitate global financial stability and the smooth 
flow of goods, services, and capital across countries, with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) at its core—was not effective in helping the crisis-affected economies manage and 
overcome the crisis, and that the IMF even exacerbated the severity of the crisis. As a result, 
many Asian policymakers and observers questioned the credibility of the IMF. 
The Asian financial crisis heightened calls for the reform of the international financial 
architecture. The international community and international organizations—such as the IMF, 
the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)—undertook efforts to reform the 
international financial architecture. These efforts included: the establishment of the Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF); the creation of a new Group of Twenty (G20) process for finance 
ministers and central bank governors; improvements of information transparency and 
disclosure; the adoption of international standards and codes; stronger financial regulation 
through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; the introduction of collective action 
clauses in new sovereign bond issues as part of private sector involvement; and reforms of 
IMF surveillance, liquidity support, conditionality, and governance. However, the overall 
reform was limited: for example, no significant reforms were made to contain the volatility 
and procyclicality of capital flows, to fully involve the private sector through sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanisms, or to substantially improve IMF governance. 
The global financial crisis that began with the United States (US) subprime crisis in the 
summer of 2007 and exploded in the fall of 2008 following Lehman Brother’s collapse is truly 
global in the sense that it affects not only the US and Europe—the source regions of the 
crisis—but also many other developed and emerging market economies that were 
dependent on either short-term capital inflows or exports to US and European markets. This 
crisis resurrected efforts to strengthen international financial architecture. The G20 process 
has been upgraded from a ministerial process to the leaders’ process and is now considered 
as the “premier forum” for international economic cooperation (Leaders’ Statement: The 
Pittsburgh Summit, 24–25 September, 2009). The FSF has been expanded to become the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) with a greater mandate and a larger membership. And the 
IMF financial resources have been substantially augmented to assist countries affected by 
the global financial crisis. Given much larger resources, the IMF is expected to play a more 
effective role in crisis management with greater legitimacy. Hence, IMF governance reform 
has become even more critical as a means to solidify the organization’s legitimacy. 
Asian policymakers have been responding to the inadequacy of the global financial 
architecture through regional initiatives since the Asian financial crisis. In particular, 
ASEAN+3 economies (the 10 ASEAN members plus the People’s Republic of China [PRC], 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea [hereafter Korea]) have forged regional cooperative 
mechanisms for financial stability backed by regional trade and investment integration. 
These attempts—including the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), the Economic Review and Policy 
Dialogue (ERPD), and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI)—are intended to enhance 
macroeconomic management capacity, national financial systems, and the ability to provide 
                                                  
1  These economies included: Mexico (February 1995), Argentina (April 1995; March 2000-January 2003), 
Thailand (August 1997), Indonesia (November 1997-January 1998-August 1998-February 2000), Korea 
(December 1997), Russia (August 1998), Brazil (December 1998), and Turkey (December 1999-February 2002). 
See Laeven and Valencia (2008) for a survey of banking crises since the 1970s. 
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regional liquidity support. Although much progress was made, the global financial crisis has 
provided another impetus to further strengthen the regional financial architecture in East 
Asia. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the lessons learned from the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Section 3 reviews 
efforts and progress being made to reform the global financial architecture to enhance 
mechanisms and measures for crisis prevention, management, and resolution. Section 4 
assesses whether the on-going efforts at the regional level—among the ASEAN+3 finance 
ministers—have sufficiently enhanced East Asia’s resilience to capital account crises, and 
proposes new directions of reform. Section 5 concludes the paper, suggesting that the 
international financial architecture remains inadequate for East Asian purposes, and that 
further significant reforms are needed. 
2.  A NEED FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
ARCHITECTURE 
2.1  Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 was triggered by massive reversals of capital flows and 
contagion. Though deeper, structural causes of crises vary, there were common factors 
across crisis-affected countries; domestic financial firms that were inadequately regulated 
and supervised over-borrowed from abroad and over-extended loans to domestic 
corporations and projects of dubious credit quality. Furthermore, a currency crisis that 
initially appeared to be benign evolved into a full-blown economic crisis due to the mutually 
reinforcing impacts of currency depreciation, financial sector deterioration, and corporate 
sector distress. Essentially the crisis was the result of interactions between the forces of 
financial globalization and domestic structural weaknesses.
2 
2.1.1  Root Causes: Financial Globalization and Domestic Vulnerabilities 
The crisis-affected countries in Asia had liberalized controls over their domestic financial 
systems and international capital flows and, as a result, had been integrated—at least 
partially if not wholly—with global capital markets by the first half of the 1990s. In the several 
years leading up to the crisis, they had received large inflows of capital to the financial and 
corporate sectors, particularly in the form of foreign currency-denominated, short-term 
capital, which was not hedged. As a result, the ratios of short-term external debt to foreign 
exchange reserves had risen to levels greater than unity. When market perceptions changed 
rapidly in 1997, these economies saw rapid outflows of capital and the consequent large 
downward pressures on currencies. The currency crisis was triggered by the sudden 
reversal of capital flows, which is why the crisis was often called the “capital account crisis.”
3 
Regional contagion of the crisis was spectacular. The impact of the Thai baht devaluation 
quickly spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and eventually Korea within a matter 
of a few months. The currencies in these economies depreciated drastically in short order. At 
a later stage, Hong Kong, China was also affected, but the authorities managed successfully 
to contain its impact using unconventional policy measures. 
The affected countries had domestic structural weaknesses. A part of foreign capital was 
intermediated by domestic banks and nonbank financial firms that extended loans to 
domestic sectors including real estate and construction, while a part of capital found its way 
directly to domestic corporations. Investment in real estate and other assets contributed to 
                                                  
2 See the twin studies by the World Bank (1998, 2000). 
3 See Yoshitomi and Shirai (2000); Kawai, Newfarmer, and Schmukler (2005); and Ghosh et al. (2002). 
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asset price bubbles in many economies, which left financial firms and corporate borrowers 
with serious balance sheet problems when the bubble ultimately burst. In this way, banks 
and nonbanks that intermediated foreign capital to domestic sectors were exposed to the 
“double mismatch” problem (Goldstein 1998)—i.e., currency and maturity mismatches—by 
borrowing short in foreign currency and lending long in domestic currency. Domestic 
corporations that had increased their leverage were also exposed to interest and exchange 
rate shocks. Steep exchange rate depreciation, high and rising interest rates and tight 
budgets—brought about by market forces and policy responses prescribed by the IMF—
aggravated financial and corporate sector distress and led to a sharp contraction of 
economic activity in 1998. 
2.1.2  Lessons 
There are at least two important lessons to draw from the Asian financial crisis. First, on the 
domestic front, if a country is to be increasingly integrated with international capital markets, 
its policymakers must have the capacity to prudently manage the forces of financial 
globalization in order to deal with any of its undesirable impacts. Until the crisis, the 
implications of the scope and magnitude of short-term capital flows had not been fully 
understood by international investors, borrowing country policymakers, or international 
organizations. More fundamentally, there was a lack of concern over the volatile and 
procyclical nature of capital flows and the need to monitor and manage easily reversible 
capital flows. 
Emerging market economies need to strengthen their domestic economic underpinnings—by 
creating effective frameworks for achieving macroeconomic and financial stability—in order 
to make them more resilient to domestic and external shocks. This task requires the 
enhanced capacity of policymakers to respond to various shocks, through macroeconomic 
policy tools, as well as effective frameworks of financial-sector regulation and supervision. 
With a robust domestic economic system, a country could prevent a crisis or mitigate its 
impact on the economy. The authorities in the region need to: 
•  put in place sound macroeconomic policy, including monetary, fiscal, exchange 
rate, and debt management policies to avoid asset price bubbles, large current 
account deficits, high leverage, and the double mismatches; 
•  strengthen financial-sector regulation and supervision to help improve asset-
liability and risk management capacity on the part of banks and nonbank financial 
firms; and 
•  develop domestic market infrastructure for financial and corporate sectors—
including corporate governance, accounting, auditing, and information disclosure—
to make the fundamental structure of the economy resilient to shocks. 
Second, on the international front, the global financial architecture should be reformed. A 
major thrust of the reform philosophy was that the international financial market contained 
systemic problems, which could threaten the stability and health of many emerging market 
economies that were being integrated with, and so exposed to, global financial markets. The 
solution would require concerted efforts by both developed and emerging market economies: 
to make international capital flows from developed countries less procyclical and more 
stable; to improve economic surveillance of an economy so as to detect early signs of 
vulnerabilities and risks that could lead to a financial crisis; to ensure timely availability of 
adequate international liquidity at the onset of a crisis; and to encourage the IMF to 
formulate appropriate policy conditionality, associated with crisis lending, reflecting the 
specific situations of the economy in crisis. 
To summarize, the Asian financial crisis demonstrated the importance of establishing both a 
more resilient domestic economic and financial system and a better functioning global 
financial system as key to crisis prevention, management, and resolution. 
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2.2  Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 
2.2.1  Severity of the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis 
The US subprime mortgage crisis that emerged in the summer of 2007 spread to the entire 
US financial system and other industrialized country financial markets. Many European 
countries also had their own financial vulnerabilities.
4 With the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008, the crisis in the US and Europe moved quickly from the financial sector 
to the real economy. It became a full-blown global financial and economic crisis. Real GDP 
contracted sharply in the US, Europe, and other economies affected by sudden stops—or 
even reversals—of capital flows and sharp declines in exports. 
This crisis is different from other financial crises observed over the last several decades, not 
only in its breadth and magnitude but also in its origin. The crisis is global, affecting almost 
all countries in the world, not just a few, with devastating impact. The epicenter of this crisis 
was not a peripheral country, but the US, which is the largest and most central economy in 
the world, home to the most dominant global key currency—the dollar—and the world’s most 
sophisticated and developed financial system. 
2.2.2  Root Causes: Flaws in Financial Regulation and Monetary Policymaking in  
the US 
The root cause of the global financial crisis traces back to the buildup of excessive optimism, 
nurtured by the “great moderation”—a long period of world-wide high, sustained economic 
growth, low real interest rates and subdued volatility of financial prices—as well as the flood 
of liquidity, which chased assets and thereby depressed yields. With these benign 
macroeconomic and financial environments, investors around the world were prompted to 
search for yield and so underestimated and underpriced risks involved in investments such 
as complex, structured products. The IMF (2009) summarized the initial lessons of the global 
financial crisis in three dimensions: lack of effective financial regulation and supervision; 
failure of monetary policy to address the buildup of systemic risk; and a weak global financial 
architecture. 
First, there were regulatory and supervisory deficiencies; national financial regulation and 
supervision failed to see the large buildup and concentration of systemic risks in the US (and 
the United Kingdom [UK] and several other European countries). The scope of regulation 
and supervision was narrowly focused on insured deposit-taking firms and did not 
adequately cover all financial activities that posed economy-wide risks. The “shadow 
banking” system—comprising investment banks, mortgage-brokers and originators, special 
investment vehicles, insurance companies writing credit default swaps, and other private 
asset pools—grew, as it had long been lightly regulated by a patchwork of agencies and 
generally not supervised prudentially.
5  The financial supervisors failed to recognize 
                                                  
4 In addition to investing in “toxic” assets created by US financial firms, Western European countries also had 
exposure to inflated real estate and Eastern European economies. 
5 US regulators could not detect the overall growth of “shadow banking system” due to the highly fragmented 
nature of the US regulatory and supervisory framework; bank supervision was divided among five federal 
agencies and the states; insurance companies were supervised at the state level; investment banks were 
supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and derivatives trading in organized 
exchanges were supervised by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission while over-the-counter derivatives 
were under no agency supervision.  
Basel I encouraged the creation of off balance sheet special-purpose vehicles that contributed to the subprime 
crisis; the SEC lifted the net capital rule for investment banks, enabling them to double or even triple their 
leverage; credit rating agencies employed practices that were fraught with conflicts of interest; and mortgage 
banks, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac employed lax lending practices. 
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interconnections and links across firms, sectors, and markets due to the lack of a more 
comprehensive macroprudential approach.
6 
Second, the US Federal Reserve underestimated the seriousness of financial imbalances 
created by excess liquidity, housing price bubbles, and the high leverage and wholesale g 
funding of, and interconnections between, financial firms.
7 With regard to the role of US 
monetary policy behind the subprime and overall financial crisis, Fed Chairman Ben 
Bernanke (2005) argued that the savings glut in Asia overwhelmed the efforts of central 
banks in the US and elsewhere to raise policy interest rates,
8 suggesting that the global 
payments imbalance, rather than US monetary policy, was the cause of the subprime crisis. 
In contrast, Taylor (2009) argued that the Fed policies brought excessive liquidity and low 
interest rates to the US, and concluded that the federal funds rate was kept too low for too 
long, fueling the housing boom and other economic imbalances. There is a consensus that 
the Fed’s tardiness in raising short-term rates fueled the bubble. 
Third, there were deficiencies in the global financial architecture. Global organizations—like 
the IMF, OECD, BIS, and FSF—were not effective in macro-financial surveillance of 
systemically important economies. That is, they failed to detect the buildup of systemic risk 
in the US, the UK, and the eurozone, send clear warnings to policymakers, and provide 
policy advice on measures to reduce the risk.
9 These organizations clearly underestimated 
the looming risk in the shadow banking system, interconnections across financial firms, 
markets, and countries and global macroeconomic-financial links.
10 
The crisis also revealed the weakness of fragmented international arrangements for 
regulation, supervision, and resolution of internationally active, large, and complex financial 
firms. The problem became particularly acute when such firms began to fail. Authorities were 
often quick to ring-fence assets of failed firms in their jurisdictions because of the absence of 
clear international rules governing crisis management and resolution and burden sharing of 
losses in the event of failures of large, complex financial firms with cross-border 
operations.
11 
                                                  
6 Supervisors tend to focus only on their own limited responsibilities, overlooking the larger problem. Shin (2009) 
pointed out a fallacy of aggregation: “mis-educated” supervisors and examiners were focused on individual 
financial firms, without regard to the impact on the system. 
7 The Fed may have had the expectation that prudential regulation would control any such financial imbalances 
and buildup of systemic risk, and that even if the asset price boom were to collapse, the impacts on the financial 
system and the economy could be mitigated by lower interest rates. 
8 Alan Greenspan (2005) described the surprisingly low interest rates on long-term government bonds in the face 
of monetary policy tightening as a “conundrum.” He attributed it partly to economic globalization. Bernanke 
suggested that the world was suffering from low time preference, that is, “global savings glut.” 
9 The IMF (2009) admits that “official warnings both within and outside the Fund were insufficiently specific, 
detailed, or dire to gain traction with policymakers.” 
10 In contrast, there was considerable discussion of “global imbalances” during 2002–2007. The IMF in particular 
warned repeatedly that global imbalances posed a serious risk to global financial stability. It made efforts to 
obtain specific policy commitments from major economies—particularly the US and the PRC—through the newly 
established Multilateral Consultation process, but met only limited success. The IMF and the US focused on the 
need for the PRC to revalue the currency, without the US pursuing policies to contain overconsumption, an 
underlying factor behind the huge current account deficits. The global imbalance discussion may have diverted 
policymakers’ attention away from US domestic financial imbalances and buildup of systemic risk toward the 
possible dollar collapse. 
11 For example, under “domestic depositor preference” and the “single-entity approach” to resolution, the US 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver is required to seek control over all foreign assets of a failed 
US bank. Facing an imminent collapse of Icelandic bank branches under the authority of Icelandic supervisors, 
UK supervisors decided to ring-fence Icelandic bank assets hoping to assure that liabilities to UK banks would be 
met. The German authorities froze Lehman Brothers’ assets to assure the availability of cash to satisfy depositors 
before the funds were attached to the parent under US bankruptcy proceedings. 
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2.2.3  Lessons 
Two important lessons can be extracted from the global financial crisis, on the national front 
as well as the international front. First, at the national level, a country clearly needs to 
establish the capacity to prevent a financial crisis. This would require prudent 
macroeconomic policy and effective financial regulation and supervision. It is now well 
understood that if prudential supervisory action cannot prevent a buildup of systemic risk, 
then the central bank, as a macro-financial overseer, should react to credit booms, rising 
leverage, sharp asset price increases, and the buildup of financial vulnerabilities through 
tighter monetary policy. Each country should establish an effective, powerful “systemic 
stability regulator” that is in charge of crisis prevention, management and resolution (Kawai 
and Pomerleano 2009). 
Crisis management and resolution at the national level would require well-functioning 
mechanisms for resolving bad debt and insolvent financial firms. A coordinated approach is 
needed to resolve both bank nonperforming loans (NPLs) and corporate or household debt. 
A clear legal and operational framework is needed to enable the orderly and timely exit of 
insolvent financial firms, including closures (liquidation), mergers with healthier institutions, 
and temporary nationalization. These mechanisms should be designed with the view that the 
longer resolution takes, the larger the eventual economic costs. 
Second, at the international level, further reform of the global financial architecture is needed, 
including the role of the IMF and the framework of global financial regulation and supervision. 
Global macroeconomic and financial stability is essential to sustained growth of world trade, 
international capital flows, and economic activity, where the IMF has a critical role to play. 
However, the IMF neither identified macro-financial risks in the US (and key European 
countries) and the implications of the subprime crisis for global finance, trade and capital 
flows, nor urged the US (and European countries) to take necessary policy actions. The IMF 
has now acquired extraordinarily large financial resources (tripling in size from US$250 
billion to US$750 billion) due to the global financial crisis it did not predict. The IMF faces the 
challenge of how to improve the effectiveness of its macro-financial surveillance. 
A clearly defined international framework should be introduced to strengthen global 
supervision and regulation of systemically important financial firms so that their cross-border 
activities can be adequately monitored, regulated, and supervised. Also, given that the 
existing home country based resolution arrangements are unsustainable,
12  a new 
international regime is needed to resolve nonviable, internationally active financial firms in an 
orderly manner. Ideally, a new global financial regulatory and supervisory body—that could 
be called the World Financial Organization (Eichengreen 2009a, 2009b)—should be created 
to facilitate international harmonization of supervision and regulation as well as crisis 
prevention, management, and resolution. 
2.3  Crisis Prevention, Management, and Resolution 
Valuable lessons can be found from examining some policy mistakes—such as the failure to 
avoid “double mismatches,” to contain asset price bubbles, and to prevent excessive risk-
taking by financial firms—as well as how the global financial architecture proved to be 
inadequate for crisis prevention, management, and resolution. The most important lesson is 
that “it is better to prevent a crisis than cure it.” However, when a crisis breaks out, efficient 
crisis management and resolution become crucial. The national, global, and regional 
                                                  
12 Hüpkes (2009) found that the cross-border framework for managing a crisis is weak and that the winding-down 
of a large cross-border financial firm is complex. The resolution is hampered by the asymmetries of exposures 
across jurisdictions that create a risk of asset ring-fencing and discourage the sharing of information and 
collaboration; multiple (and conflicting) insolvency processes across jurisdictions; resolution tools that do not 
work when markets are not functioning; and practical constraints such as technical competence across 
jurisdictions and different time zones. 
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dimensions of crisis prevention, management, and resolution are summarized in Table 1 (the 
regional aspect will be explained later in Section 4).
13 
2.3.1  Crisis Prevention 
The first key effort should be to strengthen crisis prevention mechanisms, recognizing that 
crisis prevention is the first best solution. The major preventive mechanisms are: (i) 
implementation of sound macroeconomic policies (monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and 
public debt management policies); (ii) establishment of effective financial regulation and 
supervision that monitors and acts on economy-wide systemic risk; and (iii) maintenance of 
sustainable current account and capital account positions. 
The implementation of sound macroeconomic policies is a fundamental requirement for 
crisis prevention. Monetary and fiscal policies should be used to achieve low inflation, and 
sustainable growth—without boom-and-bust cycles. They should also be used, together with 
macroprudential policies, to achieve stable asset prices and sound financial intermediation. 
For this purpose, national policymakers must strengthen both macro-financial surveillance 
and monetary and prudential policy coordination to achieve price stability and financial 
stability. At the global level, the IMF should enhance the effectiveness of surveillance by 
elevating its ability to identify economic and financial vulnerabilities particularly in 
systemically important economies—like the US, the UK, and the eurozone—as they affect 
the global economy. The IMF must also obtain tools to compel the respective authorities to 
reduce such identified vulnerabilities. 
Establishing an effective framework of financial sector regulation and supervision is the 
second requirement for crisis prevention. The regulator must go beyond the traditional 
bottom-up, microprudential supervision that addresses the soundness of individual financial 
firms, and take a top-down, macroprudential approach that recognizes interconnections and 
links across financial firms, sectors, and markets and considers system-wide risks that could 
threaten the health and stability of the whole financial sector and the overall economy. 
Adopting financial regulations that reduce the procyclicality of credit growth and capital 
inflows is an important challenge. For example, countercyclical elements can be included in 
the regulation of financial intermediation and capital flows (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2003; 
Ocampo and Chiappe 2003). At the global level, the monitoring and supervision of large, 
internationally active financial firms should be improved, as should the regulation of rating 
agencies, hedge funds, highly complex structured products, derivatives, and remuneration. 
The international community has been encouraging enhanced information transparency for 
emerging economies and markets. Lack of accurate information on the economies and 
markets in question can create instability in investor perceptions and price and transaction 
volatility by amplifying exuberance, disappointment, and herd behavior. Thus, each country 
must improve the transparency of information on macroeconomic development, and financial 
sector conditions. 
Similarly, the global financial crisis underscored the need to enhance the transparency of 
financial instruments and markets. The opacity of collateralized debt obligations, the off-
balance activities of banks, and credit debt default swaps offered by banks and nonbank 
financial firms were significant factors behind the crisis. Enhanced information disclosure of 
key market instruments and major activities of market players—such as banks, nonbank 
financial firms, mutual funds and alternative investment pools (such as hedge funds)—is 
clearly necessary.
14 
                                                  
13 This is an attempt to extend the author’s earlier studies (Kawai 2002; and Kawai and Rana 2008) in order to 
capture the early lessons from the global financial crisis. 
14 See De Brouwer (2001) for the role of hedge funds during the Asian financial crisis. 
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Table 1: Summary of Policy Lessons from the Asian and Global Financial Crises 
Objective  National Measures  Global Measures  Regional Measures 
Preventing 
or reducing 
the risk of 
systemic 
crises 
Establish effective financial regulation & supervision to monitor and act on economy-wide systemic risk 
•  Establish a national systemic stability 
regulator or council in charge of 
containing systemic risk 
•  Improve information transparency and 
disclosure in financial & corporate 
sectors 
•  Strengthen macroprudential supervision 
with focus on consolidated supervision of 
systemically important institutions 
•  Improve monitoring of household and 
corporate sectors 
•  Reduce procyclicality of regulation 
• Strengthen  capacity, 
resources and effectiveness 
of FSB to promote global 
systemic stability 
•  Support implementation of 
international standards and 
codes, and best-practice 
corporate governance 
•  Agree on regulations over 
rating agencies, hedge funds, 
remuneration, etc 
•  Establish a regional 
systemic stability council, 
such as the European 
Systemic Risk Board and 
the proposed Asian 
Financial Stability Dialogue 
• Strengthen  regional 
monitoring of financial 
markets 
•  Develop regional early 
warning systems 
Adopt sound macroeconomic management (monetary, fiscal, exchange rate, and public debt) 
•  Pursue non-inflationary monetary policy 
•  Maintain sound fiscal policy and manage 
public debt prudently 
• Use  monetary  policy to head off 
excesses, booms and asset price 
bubbles 
•  Avoid boom-and-bust business cycles 
•  Strengthen IMF surveillance 
and early earning systems, 
with focus on systemically 
important economies 
• Utilize  private-sector 
monitoring 
•  Strengthen regional policy 
dialogue and monitoring 
•  Develop regional early 
warning system 
•  Promote regional exchange 
rate policy coordination 
Maintain sustainable current account and capital account positions 
•  Avoid excessive currency overvaluation 
•  Avoid persistent current account deficits 
and heavy reliance on S/T capital inflows 
•  Coordinate policies to avoid 
unsustainable global 
payments imbalances 
•  Expand regional demand 




Provide timely liquidity of sufficient magnitude 
•  Formulate consistent policy packages 
including liquidity support with a view to 
reducing moral hazard problems  
•  Strengthen IMF liquidity 
support, including the new 
Flexible Credit Line 
•  Strengthen a regional 
liquidity support facility to 
contain crises and 
contagion 
Support the financial sector within a consistent framework 
•  Extend guarantees of bank obligations 
•  Conduct stress tests to identify losses 
and capital needs of financial institutions 
•  Establish a consistent framework for 
NPL removal and recapitalization  
•  Establish a common 
international rule for public 
sector interventions in the 
distressed financial system 
• Avoid  financial  protectionism 
• Harmonize  national 
interventions in the financial 
system—such as bank 
deposit guarantees—at the 
regional level 
Adopt appropriate macroeconomic policies to mitigate the adverse feedback loop between financial and 
real sectors 
•  Adopt an appropriate monetary and 
fiscal policy mix contingent on the 
specific conditions of the economy 
•  Be prepared for extraordinary policies 
•  Streamline IMF conditionality 
•  Design international fiscal 
support programs for fiscally 
constrained economies 
• Strengthen  regional 
capacity to formulate 
conditionality  
•  Create regional fiscal 




Create frameworks for resolving financial firms’ impaired assets and corporate and household debt  
•  Establish frameworks for resolving bad 
assets of financial institutions  
•  Introduce legal and out-of-court 
procedures for corporate debt workouts 
• Harmonize  national 
frameworks for resolving bad 
assets of financial 
institutions 
•  Provide international support 
•  Finance regional programs 
to help accelerate bank and 
corporate restructuring 
Introduce domestic rules for exit of nonviable financial firms 
•  Establish clear legal and formal 
procedures for exits of insolvent financial 
firms  
• Harmonize  national 
resolution regimes for 
nonviable financial firms 
• Harmonize  insolvency 
procedures by adopting 
good practices 
Establish international rules for sovereign debt restructuring and insolvent financial firm resolution 
•  Strengthen national procedures for debt 
workout and insolvencies of nonviable, 
internationally active financial firms 
•  Introduce international rules 
for cross-border debt 
workout and insolvencies 
•  Develop regional rules for 
cross-border debt workout 
and insolvencies 
Provide fiscal support to help emerging and developing economies resolve crises 
•  Maintain fiscal space to prepare for crisis 
response and resolution 
•  Provide fiscal support for 
crisis response and 
resolution 
•  Finance regional programs 
to assist crisis resolution 
Source: Author. 
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2.3.2  Crisis Management 
Once a financial crisis breaks out, the authorities must limit the magnitude and duration of 
the crisis. Crisis management tools include: (i) provision of timely and adequate liquidity in 
domestic and international currency; (ii) support of ailing financial firms through guarantees, 
stress tests, NPL removal, and recapitalization; and (iii) adoption of appropriate 
macroeconomic policies to mitigate the adverse feedback loop between the financial sector 
and the real economy. An important challenge is how to prevent such policy measures from 
creating moral hazard problems. 
At the time of a currency crisis or contagion in emerging markets—particularly when 
resulting from irrational herd behavior—timely provision of large-scale international liquidity 
of sufficient magnitude is essential to prevent the country from slipping into a serious 
contraction. When a crisis is driven by external factors or herd behavior, international 
liquidity support should be provided automatically to such a country without conditionality 
(Sachs 2008). There is a call for making the IMF the international lender of last resort 
(Fischer 1999) particularly for countries without adequate foreign exchange reserves or 
reliable credit lines. However, the IMF developed-country members reject this view because 
of potentially large resource needs and possible moral hazard problems. If automatic, broad-
based liquidity support without conditions is problematic, then the required policy 
conditionality—including macroeconomic (monetary and fiscal) and structural policies—
should be minimized. Details of such policy adjustment should be based on the country’s 
particular conditions. 
The financial authority needs to respond to a financial crisis with a set of comprehensive 
policy measures. These could include provision of liquidity to troubled financial firms, 
guarantees of deposits and interbank claims, a rigorous assessment of major firms’ balance 
sheets through stress tests, removal of NPLs from their balance sheets, recapitalization of 
viable firms, and consigning nonviable firms for orderly resolution. Prompt intervention is 
critical when the crisis deepens rapidly. After recapitalization, owners of financial firms 
should have sufficient incentives to restructure—through for example a write-down—their 
bad assets held against viable borrowers. 
When internationally active financial firms become bankrupt, host country authorities often 
are tempted to manage the firms’ assets and liabilities within their regulatory jurisdictions, in 
the absence of international standards for cross-border cooperation on crisis management. 
This often creates international conflict as different countries’ authorities tend to pursue their 
respective national interests.
15 A binding international agreement on crisis management is 
urgently needed when large, complex financial firms with cross-border businesses fail. 
2.3.3  Crisis Resolution 
Once a currency crisis evolves into a full-blown economic crisis, with systemic damages to 
the banking and corporate sectors, it is vital to quickly resolve the problem. Crisis resolution 
measures should include: (i) use of mechanisms for resolving financial firms’ impaired assets 
and corporate and household debt; (ii) use of well-functioning domestic insolvency 
procedures for nonviable financial firms; and (iii) use of international rules for the 
restructuring of external (sovereign) debt as well as the resolution of nonviable, 
internationally active financial firms, including clear burden sharing mechanisms among 
private investors and debtors and among different countries’ authorities, respectively. 
                                                  
15 A report by the Financial Stability Forum (2008) provides principles for cross-border cooperation on crisis 
management. But the recommendations are based on voluntary cooperation and do not offer any roadmap for 
compelling action or implementation. It is useful to identify such principles, but it is unrealistic to assume that 
countries will follow voluntary principles and reject self-interest in financial crises. Ultimately, in the absence of an 
internationally binding agreement, self-interest will force the countries to not adopt the principles in a real crisis. 
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Creating domestic mechanisms for resolving impaired financial-firm assets and corporate 
and household liabilities is the first priority. Resolution of nonviable financial firms (by way of 
liquidation, closure, nationalization, merger, and acquisition) and revitalization of viable firms 
(through recapitalization, carving out of NPLs, and their transfer to asset management 
companies) are two key strategies. This must be accompanied by frameworks to facilitate 
early corporate or household debt restructuring: creation of enabling environments by 
eliminating legal and tax impediments to corporate restructuring; strengthening of court-
based bankruptcy, reorganization and foreclosure laws, and legal protection of creditor 
rights; and establishment of voluntary, out-of-court frameworks for corporate restructuring 
based on the “London rules.” 
Establishing international rules for the orderly restructuring of external debt is necessary. 
The importance of such agreements was exemplified by the restructuring of external debt 
owed to Korean banks, which was agreed to in December 2007, effectively stabilizing the 
country’s financial markets. As a result of the global financial crisis, small European 
peripheral countries—such as Iceland and the Baltic states—assumed huge external debt 
obligations, which would require international restructuring in order to allow these countries 
to return to the path of debt sustainability with growth. The purpose of international debt 
workout is to promote debtor-creditor negotiations so as to reach restructuring agreements 
that allow rollovers, extension of maturities, and possibly debt and/or interest reductions—
while suspending payments on external debt through a “stand still” arrangement. A “stand 
still” is often needed to protect the rights of all creditors in an equitable way during 
negotiations; otherwise assets can drain out of the country in a disorderly way. Such rules 
could lead to fair burden sharing of losses between creditors and debtors (or national 
authorities if a large portion of debts are socialized). 
In addition, internationally agreed resolution rules for failed financial firms with cross-border 
operations would allow the orderly exit of such firms and, as a result, could reduce the 
effects of uncertainty on trading, custodial relationships, and confidence in the market and 
avoid national ring-fencing of the financial industry. Such rules could force seemingly “too big 
to fail” or “too interconnected to fail” financial firms to exit and, thus, help minimize the risk of 
moral hazard by requiring both creditors and debtors to share the burden of losses. 
Crisis resolution can be costly as the government often has to intervene in the financial and 
corporate sectors by providing guarantees and recapitalization. Fiscally constrained 
emerging market economies may have to seek external financial assistance in order to 
secure needed fiscal resources. Such fiscal needs can be potentially huge if the government 
has to increase spending in response to a deepening crisis. The international community—
including the World Bank, regional development banks, and bilateral donor countries—needs 
to help a crisis-affected country mitigate the adverse real-sector impact of a crisis and 
restructure its financial and corporate sectors. 
3.  PROGRESS ON THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
Intensive debates on the reform of the international financial architecture took place in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (see Eichengreen 1999; Kenen 2001), and led to 
limited progress on reforms. Such progress includes: strengthening the international 
framework through the creation of such forums as the G20 and the FSF; enhancing 
information transparency and promoting best practices; improving financial regulation 
through the reform of the Basel Capital Accord; introducing collective action clauses in new 
sovereign issues, and implementing some reforms of IMF operations. Nonetheless, these 
reforms were largely inadequate and incomplete, with major reforms yet to be undertaken in 
such areas as private sector involvement for sovereign debt restructuring, the regulation of 
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hedge funds and capital flows, the provision of international liquidity support, and IMF 
governance. 
While the momentum from earlier discussions faded away in the early 2000s, the eruption of 
the global financial crisis of 2007–09 generated renewed interest in international financial 
architecture reform. Now, the institutional set-up has been further strengthened, plans to 
tighten financial market regulation and supervision have been proposed, and more efforts to 
improve IMF governance are being made. Although it is too early to fully assess the 
effectiveness of such efforts, some preliminary evaluations are made below. 
3.1  Standards and Codes and Information Transparency 
3.1.1  Standards and Codes 
The international community has focused on the importance of an internationally recognized 
set of standards and codes of best practices in policymaking, in areas that directly benefit 
macroeconomic policymaking and in the functioning of financial markets.
16 The adoption of 
international standards and codes is expected to assist countries in strengthening their 
economic institutions, and inform market participants of recent key developments—through 
public disclosure of IMF Article IV consultation papers, IMF-World Bank Financial Sector 
Assessment Programs (FSAPs), and World Bank country assistance strategies. 
The IMF, World Bank, OECD, International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), and BIS have established international standards in 12 areas, which are broadly 
categorized into three groups: (i) macroeconomic policy transparency, (ii) financial sector 
regulation and supervision, and (iii) financial market integrity. Standards in macroeconomic 
policy transparency include data dissemination, fiscal transparency, and monetary and 
financial policy transparency. Standards in financial regulation and supervision cover five 
areas: banking supervision, securities, insurance, payments systems, and anti-money 
laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. Standards for financial market integrity 
include corporate governance, accounting, auditing, and insolvency and creditor rights. 
At the request of a member country, that country’s observance—and implementation—of 
standards in each of the 12 areas is assessed by the IMF and the World Bank, and the 
results of these assessments are summarized in a Report on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSCs). Publication of these assessments by member countries is voluntary, 
although the IMF and World Bank do encourage their publication. As of February 2008, 
nearly three-fourths of its 185 member countries had completed one or more ROSC 
modules, of which 76% had been published (Kawai and Rana 2008). 
3.1.2  Information Transparency 
Data dissemination standards can enhance the availability of timely and comprehensive 
statistics, and so contribute to the design of sound macroeconomic policies. The IMF has 
taken several steps to help enhance information transparency and openness—including the 
establishment and strengthening of data dissemination standards—to help member country 
policymakers prevent future crises and diminish the effect of those that occur. 
The standards for data dissemination consist of two tiers, the Special Data Dissemination 
Standard (SDDS) and the General Data Dissemination System (GDDS). The SDDS was 
established in 1996 to guide emerging market economies that have, or might seek, access 
to international capital markets, while the GDDS was established in 1997 to help countries 
provide more reliable data. Both are voluntary, but once a country subscribes to the SDDS, 
observance of the standard becomes mandatory. Countries must also agree to post 
information about their data dissemination practices on the IMF’s external website on 
                                                  
16 Standards and codes refer to provisions relating to the institutional environment or “rules of the game” within 
which economic and financial policies are devised and implemented. 
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Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB), and establish an Internet site containing 
the actual data, called a National Summary Data Page, to which the DSBB is linked. The 
IMF notes that approximately 81% of its membership participates in the new data initiatives. 
Although an increasing volume of information has been made publicly available, this has not 
prevented a buildup of vulnerabilities and systemic risk within a country as investors have 
often neglected such information in times of market exuberance. In this sense information 
transparency in and of itself is not a panacea, but the availability of data and information, as 
long as investors have the capacity to integrate them in decision making, is clearly useful in 
guiding often turbulent markets towards economic fundamentals. 
3.2  Creating a Robust and Resilient Financial System 
3.2.1  Financial System Soundness 
The presence of a sound financial system—comprising banks, security houses, securities 
exchanges, pension funds, insurers, and alternative investment vehicles—is essential to 
support sustainable economic growth and development, and the role of the central bank and 
national supervisors/regulators is critical in promoting financial stability. 
The IMF helps promote financial system soundness through its ongoing bilateral and 
multilateral surveillance, the FSAP, and the provision of technical assistance.
17 In 1999 the 
IMF and the World Bank jointly launched the FSAP, as a means to provide member 
countries with a comprehensive evaluation of their financial systems—thereby alerting 
national authorities on vulnerabilities in their financial sectors—and assist them in designing 
measures to reduce weaknesses. The FSAP also determines the development needs of the 
financial sector. Sectoral developments, risks, and vulnerabilities are analyzed using a range 
of financial soundness indicators and macro-financial stress tests.
18 As of March 2008, 
FSAP reports had been prepared on 110 countries. It should be noted that while the IMF 
reportedly requested the US to undergo an FSAP evaluation prior to the outbreak of the 
subprime crisis, the US government rejected the request. It was only at the end of 2007 
when the US finally agreed to an FSAP. 
3.2.2  Establishing the Financial Stability Board 
In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, two new international forums were launched in 
1999, the G20 process for finance ministers and central governors and the FSF for major 
economies’ financial authorities (finance ministries, central banks, and regulatory 
authorities). The G20 process was introduced as a forum to promote international financial 
cooperation to achieve stable, sustainable growth of the world economy.
19 The FSF aimed 
to facilitate information exchange among major financial centers and strengthen international 
cooperation on financial market supervision and surveillance. 
With the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the fall of 2008, the G20 was upgraded from 
a finance ministers’ process to the leaders’ process, with the objective of supporting global 
economic recovery and putting the economy back on track to sustainable growth. It has 
become the “premier forum” for international economic and financial cooperation, possibly 
                                                  
17 Bilateral surveillance is the process of regular dialogue and policy advice provided to each member country, 
and covers macroeconomic and financial developments and policies. Multilateral consultations allow the IMF to 
focus on common economic and financial issues, such as global payments imbalances. Technical assistance 
includes training and advice on improving monetary and fiscal management, foreign exchange and capital market 
development, development of the legal framework for banking, and prudential regulations, among other things. 
18 Other areas are also analyzed, including systemic liquidity arrangements, institutional frameworks for crisis 
management and loan recovery, transparency, accountability and governance. 
19 The members of the G20 are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada*, PRC, France*, Germany*, India, 
Indonesia, Italy*, Japan*, Korea, Mexico, Russia*, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK*, the US*, and the 
European Union (EU), where countries with * are among the G8 members. 
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replacing the narrower G8. Based on the agreements of the G20 Summit meetings, the FSF 
has been expanded to become the FSB with a sweeping mandate and a larger membership 
(rising from 12 to 25 members).
20 For the FSB to perform its ambitious mandate, it is 
essential that the US and the UK—home of the two largest international financial centers—
make full commitments to the substantial upgrading of the regulatory and supervisory 
policies. 
While pointing out the importance of ensuring an adequate balance between 
macroprudential and microprudential regulation, the G20 process is focusing on the 
following: 
•  building high quality capital and mitigate procyclicality—the introduction of higher 
levels and better quality capital requirements, countercyclical capital buffers, higher 
capital requirements for risky products and off-balance sheet activities, larger 
liquidity risk requirements, and forward-looking provisions (by the end of 2012); 
•  reforming compensation practices; 
•  improving over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets—all standardized OTC 
derivative contracts to be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, 
where appropriate, and cleared through central clearinghouses (by the end of 
2012); OTC derivative contracts to be reported to trade repositories; and non-
centrally cleared contracts to be subjected to higher capital requirements; and  
•  addressing cross-border resolutions and systemically important financial 
institutions (by the end of 2010)—including plans for systemically important 
financial firms to craft internationally consistent firm-specific contingency and 
resolution procedures, and for the authorities to develop resolution tools and 
frameworks for the effective resolution of financial groups to help mitigate the 
disruption of failures and reduce moral hazard. 
3.3  Capital Flow Management and Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
3.3.1  Capital account liberalization 
Financial crises in emerging market economies have demonstrated that abrupt or improperly 
sequenced liberalization of the capital account can generate vulnerabilities and possibly 
provoke a currency crisis. A surge in capital inflows and a sudden stop or reversal of capital 
flows can occur, often due to contagion or external shocks, not necessarily because of 
domestic factors. 
It is now well-understood that, in countries with relatively closed financial markets, capital 
account liberalization should be considered as an integral part of a comprehensive reform 
program as there is a strong linkage among capital account liberalization, domestic financial 
sector reform, and the design of monetary and exchange rate policy. That is, it should be 
properly sequenced and paced with the implementation of other reform measures so that 
countries can progress beyond “institutional thresholds” (Prasad and Rajan 2008). 
 
                                                  
20 The FSB has grown to 25 members by adding all G20 members, Spain and the EU. The original 12 members 
of the FSF are: Australia; Canada; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Italy*; Japan; Netherlands; 
Singapore; Switzerland; the UK; and the US. 
The FSB mandate is sweeping. It proposes to: assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system; identify and 
oversee action needed to address them; promote coordination and information exchange among authorities 
responsible for financial stability; monitor and advise on market developments and their implications for 
regulatory policy; advise on and monitor best practices in meeting regulatory standards; undertake joint 
strategic reviews of the policy development work of the international standards setting bodies; set guidelines 
for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges; manage contingency planning for cross-border crisis 
management; and collaborate with the IMF to conduct early warning exercises.
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From this perspective, it is useful to draft a credible timetable for capital account 
liberalization so that a financially closed country could lay out the blueprint for 
comprehensive reforms including capital account liberalization. Most important is the 
establishment of core institutional infrastructure—well-defined property and creditor rights; 
credible accounting standards; benchmark corporate governance; clear minority shareholder 
rights; stringent prudential and regulatory regimes. 
3.3.2  Capital Flow Management 
Economies with relatively open capital accounts face the challenge of managing potentially 
volatile and procyclical capital flows. Large and rapid inflows of mobile capital can suddenly 
stop or even reverse themselves and, thus, threaten domestic macroeconomic and financial-
sector stability. The authorities may use a combination of several policy options to contain or 
mitigate the impact of large, disruptive capital inflows. They may, for example: 
•  accumulate foreign exchange reserves through sterilized interventions, as a short-
term measure to cushion the impact of future reversals of capital flows; 
•  introduce greater exchange rate flexibility, leading to currency appreciation and 
stemming speculative inflows; 
•  encourage capital outflows, to lessen the upward pressure on the currency and the 
need for costly sterilized interventions; 
•  adopt prudential controls—such as higher reserve requirements and caps on 
external borrowing—that limit short-term capital inflows; 
•  tighten fiscal policy when inflows are associated with an economic boom, which 
can limit procyclical capital inflows; and 
•  establish a sound financial system. 
There is no silver bullet solution, and policymakers need to find the best combination for their 
countries given the specific country conditions. The first option listed above is not 
sustainable and bears increasingly large costs over time. The second option is reasonable 
as it frees monetary policy for domestic economic management, but may be difficult to adopt 
as exchange rate appreciation can damage the country’s international price 
competitiveness.
21 The third option is helpful, but can invite more inflows as investors can 
more easily get out. The fourth option includes the Chilean style capital inflow control—
unremunerated reserve requirements on capital inflows—that was used in Chile, Colombia, 
and Peru and has been accepted as a less distortionary measure by the IMF. The fifth 
option—promoted by the IMF—can improve the current account position and hence reduce 
vulnerabilities, but is often difficult to implement quickly. The last option is intended to make 
the financial system resilient so that the sudden stop or reversal of capital flows has only 
limited impact on the country’s financial system. But this requires structural efforts. 
Finally, emerging economy governments are often cautious in internationalizing their 
currencies as traders can use offshore markets for speculative activities. Policymakers 
should apply an integrated set of rules and regulations to prevent an overly active offshore 
market for domestic currencies, with the support of international organizations where 
appropriate (Emerging Markets Eminent Persons Group 2001). 
3.3.3  Choice of an Exchange Rate Regime 
The “two-corner solutions” argument—that either a credibly fixed peg (e.g., a currency board 
system or full dollarization) or a pure float is sustainable (Fischer 2001)—has been 
discredited as a result of the failure of the Argentine currency board system, and is 
                                                  
21 This suggests the value of international coordination of exchange rate policies that would allow joint currency 
appreciation among countries simultaneously experiencing large capital inflows. 
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inappropriate for many emerging market economies. The reason is that these economies 
have financial sectors that are not fully developed or sufficiently deep, and are only partially 
integrated into global capital markets. Their banking and corporate sectors cannot absorb 
high exchange-rate volatility under a pure float, while a fixed parity would prevent active 
monetary policymaking, required for non-inflationary growth. 
In this sense, many emerging market economies do reveal a preference for an 
“intermediate” exchange rate regime or a managed float. As these economies tend to be 
subject to various types of external shocks—commodity prices, global interest rates, and 
sudden shifts in investor sentiments—the authorities often have to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market to counter those shocks. This is certainly the case with Asian emerging 
market economies (Kawai and Takagi 2005). 
However, some economies have shown a preference for stable exchange rates anchored 
against an external currency like the US dollar. Policymakers in these economies must be 
aware that their regime choice is inevitably constrained by the “impossible trinity.” In 
addition, fixed exchange rates often provide the false sense of an implicit guarantee and, as 
a result, generate rapid capital inflows, creating a recipe for disaster, as shown in many 
emerging market economy crises. This perspective also supports the view that an 
intermediate exchange rate regime can be more resilient to volatile capital flows. 
3.4  IMF Surveillance, Liquidity Assistance, and Conditionality 
It has been widely discussed that the operations and functions of the IMF need to be 
strengthened. The IMF-IEO (Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF [2003]) has argued 
that the availability of IMF short-term liquidity at the time of crises and contagion needs to be 
increased, and that policy conditionality attached to IMF liquidity assistance to crisis 
countries needs to be streamlined, particularly with regard to the nature of macroeconomic 
policies and the scope of structural policies. 
3.4.1  IMF Surveillance 
Responding to a series of emerging market crises in the 1990s and the early 2000s, the IMF 
began to strengthen its surveillance, aiming to lessen the frequency and severity of 
disturbances. It now focuses on macroeconomic conditions and financial sector 
developments, while acknowledging the role of other structural and social issues only to the 
extent they are macro-critical, that is, having a significant impact on macroeconomic issues, 
including fiscal expenditures and debt sustainability. 
In addition, the IMF introduced multilateral consultations and regional surveillance. The role 
of multilateral consultations is to put greater focus on issues of systemic importance to the 
global financial system. The first multilateral consultation dealt with the issue of the global 
imbalance and involved several systemically important members, namely, the US, PRC, the 
eurozone, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. The enhancement of regional surveillance—through the 
publication of a Regional Economic Outlook in each region—to address the main policy 
issues facing a region and intra-regional linkages, is a welcome advance. 
There are a number of regional sources of information that the IMF could draw upon in 
improving its surveillance. The ASEAN+3 economic surveillance (EPRD), to be described 
below, is an obvious example. The participation of the IMF in the ASEAN+3 finance and 
central bank deputies’ process, as a regular policy dialogue partner, is quite useful and 
important. It would be equally useful if regional groups and entities could play a more direct 
role in the IMF surveillance process. For example, the IMF may consider having staff from 
relevant regional organizations and groups join the IMF’s annual Article IV consultation 
mission to regional member countries. In countries where a regional organization has 
financial sector operations, it would be mutually beneficial to have the organization’s staff 
involved in the FSAP. 
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3.4.2  Liquidity Support and Flexible Credit Lines 
In order to play its role in safeguarding international financial stability in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis, the IMF augmented its lending capacity and facilities. It introduced the 
Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) in December 1997 to provide short-term financing 
without access limit in the event of exceptional balance of payments difficulties attributable to 
a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence.
22 It also introduced a Contingent Credit 
Line (CCL) in 1999 as a precautionary line of defense to help protect countries pursuing 
sound policies in the event of a liquidity need arising from the spread of financial crises. 
Korea was the first crisis country to use the SRF, followed by Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey. 
However, the CCL never attracted any interest among members and, in November 2003, it 
was allowed to expire. Besides the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), a New 
Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) came into force in November 1998—doubling the resources 
of IMF. 
With the eruption of the global financial crisis and its severe impact on many emerging 
market economies, IMF resources have been augmented by US$500 billion to enhance its 
capacity to support crisis-affected economies—particularly those on the periphery of Europe. 
This augmentation of resources took the form of a renewed and expanded NAB. The IMF 
has also made Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocations of $283 billion in total, more than 
$100 billion of which will supplement emerging market and developing countries’ existing 
reserve assets. 
The IMF reintroduced a type of credit line—a Short-term Liquidity Facility (SLF)—in the fall of 
2008 to offer quick, large-scale financing without ex-post conditionality. But even the SLF 
proved ineffective and in March 2009 was superseded by a Flexible Credit Line (FCL) 
facility, which assured pre-qualified members of large, flexible, upfront access to resources 
without ex-post conditions. The FCL is similar to, but more flexible than, the earlier CCL in 
that it offers condition-free loans based on ex-ante qualification criteria and can be drawn for 
precautionary purposes.
23 Now, Colombia, Mexico, and Poland have signed the FCL. 
3.4.3  Competing Financing Arrangements 
The global financial crisis did not force any Asian country to go to the IMF for financial 
rescue, nor even raise interest rates to defend the currency value. However, several 
countries—such as Korea and Indonesia—faced the risk of sudden shortages of US dollar 
liquidity soon after the Lehman shock in the fall of 2008. Korea saw unusually large 
downward pressure on its exchange rate and a rapid depletion of foreign exchange reserves 
and, thus, encountered a mini-currency crisis. But it did not seek IMF liquidity assistance 
because of the stigma attached to the experience with IMF interventions during the 1997–98 
financial crisis. Seeking IMF assistance would have had significant political repercussions 
within the country. 
Instead Korea—together with Brazil, Mexico, and Singapore—established a currency swap 
arrangement of up to US$30 billion with the US Federal Reserve in late October. It also 
entered into currency swap arrangements with the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC) in December 2008. These currency swaps could be drawn without 
any policy conditionality and, in this sense, were arrangements that competed against IMF 
                                                  
22 SRF resources are made available over a period of one year and carry an interest rate 300bp above the 
normal IMF charges. They are expected to be repaid between 1 and 1.5 years after withdrawal but the repayment 
period can be extended for one year. In the latter case the interest spread rises to 500bp. 
23 The FCL allows longer repayment periods (3¼ to 5 years) and imposes no hard cap on access to IMF 
resources, which will be assessed on a case-by-case basis (while the SLF limited access to 500% of quota), and 
introduces flexibility to draw at any time on the credit line so that it can be used as a precautionary instrument 
(which was not allowed under the SLF). 
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facilities.
24 In fact, news that Korea established a currency swap line with the US Fed 
immediately stabilized the foreign exchange markets, and the Korean authorities actually 
drew US dollar liquidity, for currency market support. 
3.4.4  IMF Conditionality on Macroeconomic and Structural Policies 
The IMF came in for harsh criticism in 1997–98 for prescribing too contractionary 
macroeconomic policies and too many structural reforms, and providing mistakes in policy 
advice (see Ito [2007]). For example, the fiscal policy prescribed in the early phase of the 
Asian financial crisis—in Thailand and Korea—was contractionary despite the fact that fiscal 
spending and budget deficits were not causes of the crisis and that the countries were 
severely affected by the sudden withdrawal of foreign capital and plunged into a major 
recession. The Indonesian program had over 100 conditions including the reform of the rice 
distribution system and the dismantling of the clove monopoly (Feldstein 1998), which had 
nothing to do with the country’s capital account crisis. 
The IMF appears ready to move away from a “one-size-fits-all” approach to stabilization 
without always relying on prescribing contractionary macroeconomic policy in the face of 
crises originating in the capital account. The IMF has also decided to streamline and limit its 
structural conditionality to a core set of essential features that are macro-relevant and within 
the IMF’s core area of responsibility,
25 with any broader approach requiring justification 
based upon the specific country situation. Hence, IMF conditionality now covers only 
macroeconomic policies and macro-critical structural reform policies. This is an improvement 
given the lessons learnt from the Asian financial crisis, but it remains to be seen how this 
policy will be implemented. It appears that the IMF programs in Eastern European and Baltic 
states affected by the current global financial crisis are less harsh than those applied to Asia, 
but contractionary macroeconomic policies are still imposed on these economies. 
3.5  International Rules for External Debt Restructuring and Cross-
Border Insolvencies 
3.5.1  Private Sector Involvement for External Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Establishing an international collective framework for an orderly workout of external debt—by 
involving the private sector and imposing a “standstill”—is needed to achieve a fair sharing 
of the burden of losses created by a crisis. The reason is that such a framework forces 
private creditors—who made imprudent lending decisions in a crisis-affected country—to 
shoulder part of the crisis costs and, thus, mitigates the future moral hazard problem. 
By focusing on external sovereign debt, the international community explored two options: a 
contractual approach and a statutory approach. A contractual approach considers collective 
action clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts as a device for the orderly resolution of 
crises; their explicit inclusion in bond documentation would provide a degree of predictability 
to the restructuring process. A statutory approach, such as the sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism (Krueger 2002), attempts to create the legal basis—through universal treaty 
rather than through a set of national laws in a limited number of jurisdictions—for 
establishing adequate incentives for debtors and creditors to agree upon a prompt, orderly 
and predictable restructuring of unsustainable debt. 
 
                                                  
24 The PRC has also offered yuan-based currency swap lines with five other central banks, i.e., Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Malaysia; Argentina; and Belarus. But these swap lines are intended to encourage trade 
settlement rather than liquidity support for containing currency speculation, given the yuan’s lack of capital 
account convertibility. Hence they are not competing arrangements against IMF facilities. 
25 The IMF’s core areas of responsibility include: macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policy, including the underlying institutional arrangements and closely related structural measures; and 
financial sector issues including the functioning of both domestic and international financial markets. 
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The CACs approach was finally adopted, while a more comprehensive statutory approach 
was put on hold. Following Mexico’s bond issue with CACs in February 2003, several 
emerging market economies began to include CACs in bond issues under New York law. 
However, the lack of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism—a de facto international 
bankruptcy procedure for a country such as Iceland and the Baltic states in the current 
context—can continue to make crisis resolution difficult. 
3.5.2  Cross-Border Resolution of Internationally Active Financial Firms 
The major impediment to achieving global financial stability is the inadequacy of international 
rules for dealing with insolvency of internationally active, large, and complex financial firms. 
There are no international standards for cross-border bank resolution that could potentially 
overcome the problem of the existing home-country based resolution arrangements. The 
lack of cross-border resolution rules continues to pose the “too big to fail” or “too 
interconnected to fail” problem of moral hazard, amplifies uncertainty about not only crisis 
resolution, but also crisis management and burden sharing across different national 
jurisdictions. From this perspective, it is encouraging to see that the G20 is trying to address 
the issue, but it will take a long time before a truly binding international agreement is 
crafted.
26  
3.6  IMF Governance Reforms 
IMF governance reforms refer to changes in “chairs and shares” (Truman 2006)—quotas 
and voting rights, and executive board representation—and the IMF management selection 
process. The current distribution of quotas and the relative voice of members within the IMF 
have raised questions about its legitimacy among its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
IMF governance reforms are deemed to be necessary to restore its legitimacy, so that the 
IMF could acquire the authority and credibility to carry out its missions. 
3.6.1  IMF Voice and Vote Reforms 
The reform of IMF quotas and voting rights is the most important step to better acknowledge 
the new reality of the changing world economy and financial order, i.e., the rising weight of 
large, dynamic emerging market economies, especially those in Asia. Presently, the 
industrial countries as a group hold about 60% of the votes, the emerging market economies 
about 20%, and the rest of the world close to 20%. These ratios have not changed 
significantly. Reforms have begun to take place in several phases. In the first phase, at the 
2006 Singapore Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, a decision was made to 
make  ad hoc increases in the quotas of the PRC, Mexico, Korea, and Turkey by small 
amounts. The second and third phase of the reform exercise is to agree on a new quota 
formula and to further rebalance quotas (Boorman 2008). 
Another aspect of the voice and vote issue is the composition of the IMF executive board. 
Currently the European countries occupy eight of the 24 chairs at the IMF board. A 
consensus view is that European countries are over-represented at the board (as well as in 
terms of voting powers) and that they should agree to reduce their representation. There is 
an even more compelling reason to argue that, with the establishment of a monetary union, 
the eurozone should occupy a single chair. 
The Pittsburgh G20 Summit agreed to shift at least 5% of votes from over-represented 
countries, largely in Europe, to under-represented countries, mainly dynamic emerging 
                                                  
26 A possible alternative could be to develop an informal agreement similar to the London approach for 
international insolvencies. Another alternative would be to require each internationally active large bank to craft a 
“living will” where it elaborates a detailed, pre-packaged resolution procedure that would apply when regulators 
judge that the bank is insolvent. Such agreements between major banks and their regulators could result in 
greater predictability about burden sharing across regulatory jurisdictions. 
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markets and developing countries, using the current quota formula.
27 This would change the 
distribution of voting powers between the industrial countries and emerging and developing 
countries from the current 60:40 to 55:45. 
3.6.2  Credibility and Trust of IMF in Asia 
Mutual trust between the IMF and country authorities is an important element in making IMF 
operations effective because it provides a healthy environment for frank discussion and 
exchanges of views. However, the IMF has a credibility problem in Asia. At the time of the 
Asian financial crisis, the IMF lost its credibility and trust among Asian policymakers and has 
not regained them yet. The IMF has been viewed as an outside institution that lectures and, 
at times of crisis, imposes tough “conditionality” on emerging market economies with a “top-
down” analysis done in Washington without considering realities on the ground. 
One way to rectify this problem is for the IMF to truly support an objective, inclusive process 
by conducting its operations in an impartial manner. The inclusiveness should extend to the 
equal treatment of all member countries, large and small. Large, systemically important 
countries—such as the US, the UK, and the eurozone—must be subject to the same clear, 
forceful and candid surveillance messages given to other, particularly developing, countries 
with less economic weight. Given that the burden of adjustment and turbulence from these 
large economies may likely fall on many other, often emerging and developing, countries, it 
is imperative for the IMF to focus its macro-financial surveillance on these large economies 
and to hold them to the same standard as other small countries. This evenhanded treatment 
is a necessary condition for the IMF to regain credibility and trust among all regions around 
the world, especially in Asia. 
Finally, the tradition that the head of the IMF should be a Western European automatically 
disqualifies the majority of IMF member countries from leadership of this global financial 
organization. The choice of the IMF managing director should be based on merit and 
qualifications and not on nationality. This is an important way to reestablish IMF legitimacy, 
trust, and ownership on the part of all member countries. To restore the legitimacy of its 
operations, the IMF needs such significant governance reform. 
4.  EAST ASIA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 
4.1  Financial Cooperation in East Asia 
Following the Asian financial crisis, the East Asian countries began to embark on 
intergovernmental cooperation to promote regional financial stability. Each country has made 
efforts to improve its external financial health by reducing short-term borrowing in foreign 
currency—to avoid the “double mismatches”—and accumulating foreign exchange reserves. 
Each of them has strengthened its national financial system by restoring a sound banking 
sector, putting in place a better regulatory and supervisory framework, and developing 
capital markets. The economies in the region have strived to establish collective 
mechanisms for regional financial stability to increase resiliency to financial turbulence and 
shocks. 
4.1.1  ASEAN+3 Initiatives 
Leaders of the 10 ASEAN member countries along with the PRC, Japan, and Korea initiated 
the ASEAN+3 process in 1997, which focused on macroeconomic and financial issues 
initially and was later expanded to include many other issues—in foreign affairs; economy 
and trade; environment; energy; health; labor; science and technology; and social welfare, 
                                                  
27 The Group of Twenty-four, a group of developing countries forming a coalition to work on international 
monetary and financial issues, proposes a shift of 7%. 
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among others. The group’s finance ministers have been particularly active on regional 
financial cooperation, including the launch of the CMI as the region’s liquidity support 
arrangement, the ERPD as the region’s economic surveillance mechanism, both in May 
2000, and the ABMI as the region’s project for local-currency bond market development in 
August 2003.
28 
The ASEAN+3 leaders in 2004 agreed that the establishment of an “East Asian Community” 
was their long-term objective and affirmed the role of ASEAN+3 as the “main vehicle” for this 
eventual establishment. The idea of creating such a community had been proposed by the 
East Asia Vision Group (2001), whose wide-ranging proposals were considered by the 
official East Asia Study Group (2002). The ASEAN+3 leaders in 2002 received the Study 
Group’s Final Report, which identified 17 concrete short-term measures and 9 medium- to 
long-term measures—including regional financial cooperation—to move East Asian 
cooperation forward. Key medium- and long-term recommendations included, among others, 
the establishment of a regional financing facility, the pursuit of a more closely coordinated 
exchange rate mechanism, and establishment of a regional surveillance process. The CMI 
was considered to be an initial step toward the establishment of a regional self-help 
financing facility, and the ERPD became the process for regional economic surveillance. 
4.1.2  Economic Review and Policy Dialogue 
The ERPD is a regional economic surveillance system—through information exchange, 
policy discussions, and peer reviews—designed to contribute to the prevention of financial 
crises through the early detection of irregularities and vulnerabilities and the swift 
implementation of remedial policy actions. The ERPD was intended to facilitate economic 
and financial analysis of the global, regional, and individual national economies; monitoring 
of regional capital flows and financial market developments; assessment and management 
of vulnerabilities and risks; and joint actions on issues affecting the region. The expectation 
was that countries would implement better macroeconomic and financial-sector policies and 
institutional reforms due to peer pressure. 
Without a strong supporting infrastructure for such surveillance, however, the ERPD process 
has not been as effective as initially expected, though gradual improvements have been 
made over time. One of the problems has been the lack of a secretariat in charge of the 
process, and another is the absence of central bank governors in the process, although 
central bank deputies have been participating in ASEAN+3 finance deputies’ meetings.
29 
4.1.3  Chiang Mai Initiative 
The CMI is a landmark liquidity support facility in East Asia, which is intended to deter 
currency speculation and manage currency crises or contagion. It comprises (i) a network of 
bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) among the PRC, Japan, and Korea, and between one of 
these Plus-3 countries and the original five ASEAN members and (ii) the ASEAN Swap 
Arrangement (ASA). The total amount under the bilateral swap agreements reached US$90 
billion—with 16 BSAs—and the total ASA stood at US$2 billion as of April 2009. 
An important feature of the CMI is that a crisis-affected member requesting short-term 
liquidity support could immediately obtain financial assistance for the first 20% of the BSA 
amount,
30 and that the remaining 80% would be provided to the requesting member under 
                                                  
28 See Henning (2002); Bird and Rajan (2002); Kuroda and Kawai (2002); Kawai (2002); Kawai and Rana (2008); 
and ADB (2008). 
29 Central bank governors in Asia and the Oceania have formed the Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central 
Banks (EMEAP) as a completely separate forum from the ASEAN+3 finance ministers’ process. Its work focuses 
on bank supervision, financial markets, payments and settlement systems, and other issues that are of common 
interest. 
30 Initially the IMF-delink portion was 10% and it was raised to 20% in May 2005. 
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an IMF program. Linking the CMI to an IMF program and its conditionality was designed to 
address the concern that the liquidity shortage of a requesting country may be due to 
fundamental policy problems, rather than a mere panic (i.e., herd behavior) of investors or 
genuine external shocks, and that the absence of conditionality can create a potential moral 
hazard problem. The basic idea is that the CMI, as a crisis lending facility, should require 
conditionality.
31 The potential creditors under the CMI, including Japan and the PRC, seem 
to believe that the region’s inability to formulate and enforce effective adjustment programs 
in times of crisis should require the CMI to be linked to IMF programs.
32 
4.1.4  Asian Bond Markets Initiative 
ASEAN+3 policymakers are promoting local-currency bond markets through the ABMI. 
Members of the Executives’ Meeting of Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) are also 
making efforts through the Asian Bond Funds. These initiatives are expected to help make 
the Asian financial system more balanced, promote efficient allocation of financial resources 
and risks, facilitate the recycling of the region’s savings for regional investment, and reduce 
the “double mismatch” problem. 
The development and deepening of Asian local-currency bond markets could make the 
following contributions: 
•  provide alternative sources of financing for public and private investment (in 
infrastructure, to small- and medium-sized enterprises, and housing) and 
alternative modes of wealth holding for Asian institutional investors and 
households, particularly retirement fund asset management (such as pensions) in 
a rapidly aging society;  
•  improve financial resilience by putting in place two balanced wheels of the financial 
system—sound banking sectors and well-developed capital markets; 
•  reduce the “double mismatch” problem—currency and maturity mismatches—by 
mobilizing Asian savings for Asian long-term investment in local currencies and 
reducing reliance on international capital markets, which have acted both as a 
reservoir for Asian surplus funds and as a source of finance for Asian investment; 
and  
•  help reduce global payments imbalances by creating better and greater domestic 
investment opportunities. 
The ABMI has delivered some tangible results, including the recent decisions to set up a 
regional credit guarantee and investment mechanism for local-currency bond market 
development and to further explore the possibility of creating a regional clearance and 
settlement system. 
4.2  Progress on CMI Multilateralization 
4.2.1  CMI Multilateralization 
Since May 2005, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers have been working to improve the 
functioning of ERPD and CMI and to multilateralize the CMI (see Box 1). The ERPD is now 
considered as an integral part of CMI. A “self-managed reserve pooling” arrangement, 
governed by a single contractual agreement, has been introduced as a form of CMI 
                                                  
31 On the other hand, bilateral local-currency swap arrangements between central banks—such as the yen-won 
swap between the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Korea—which are part of the CMI, are not intended for crisis 
lending and, hence, not subject to conditionality. 
32 In contrast, members that are potential borrowers, such as Malaysia, seem to believe that the CMI should not 
be linked to IMF programs. 
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multilateralization (CMIM).
33  Its total size has been set at US$120 billion. Member 
contributions and borrowing limits have been decided; Japan and the PRC (including the 
mainland and Hong Kong, China) would contribute 32% each, Korea 16% and ASEAN 20%. 
A decision has been made to establish an independent “surveillance unit” to “monitor and 
analyze regional economies and support CMIM decision-making” as well as an “advisory 
panel of experts” to “work closely with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the ASEAN 
Secretariat to enhance the current surveillance mechanism in order to lay the surveillance 
groundwork for the CMIM” (Joint Media Statement of the 12
th ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting, May 2009).
34 In a sense, the CMIM is heading toward a more institutionalized 
structure, operating with the support of a surveillance unit and under the guidance of an 
advisory panel of experts. 
Box 1: Progress on ERPD and CMI 
Steady progress has been made to strengthen ERPD and CMI since their launch and more 
recently to multilateralize the CMI. Some of the major developments over the last few years 
include: 
•  integration and enhancement of ERPD into the CMI framework (May 2005); 
•  raising the ceiling for withdrawal without an IMF program in place from 10% to 
20% of the total (May 2005); 
•  adoption of the collective decision-making procedure for CMI swap activation, 
as a step toward multilateralizing the CMI (May 2006);  
•  agreement in principle on a self-managed reserve pooling arrangement 
governed by a single contractual agreement as an appropriate form of CMIM 
(May 2007);  
•  agreement on the total size of the CMIM to be at least US$80 billion and on 
the proportion of contribution coming from ASEAN countries and the Plus-3 
countries to be 20:80 (May 2008); 
•  increasing the total size of CMIM from US$80 billion to US$120 billion, 
establishment of an independent surveillance unit, and a possible increase in 
the IMF de-linked portion above the current limit of 20 percent (February 
2009); and 
•  agreement on all the main components of CMIM—including the individual 
country contributions, borrowing accessibility, and the surveillance 
mechanism—and the implementation of the CMIM before the end of 2009, 
including the establishment of an advisory panel of experts in addition to an 
independent surveillance unit (May 2009). 
Source: ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting Statements, various years. 
The agreement on country contributions, particularly among the Plus-3 countries, was a 
significant achievement. A few points are noteworthy. First, the CMIM is now designed as a 
US dollar liquidity support arrangement—thereby excluding the local-currency swaps that 
are in place in the CMI BSAs—under the same IMF-link arrangement. Second, the CMIM 
has included all ASEAN+3 members, while Brunei and low-income ASEAN members 
(Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam) were not included 
in the CMI BSAs. Hong Kong, China has also joined the CMIM without becoming a formal 
                                                  
33 Here, CMIM refers to both the wider series of multilateralization and the reserve fund. 
34 The de facto “surveillance unit” function has been fulfilled by the ADB and the ASEAN Secretariat. For 
example, the ASEAN+3 finance ministers meeting is always convened with the support of the ASEAN Secretary 
General and the participation of the ADB President in policy dialogue with the ministers. The deputies’ meeting 
has been attended by the ASEAN Secretariat, ADB, and other expert organizations (including more recently the 
IMF). The ADB has been providing a confidential report to the deputies. 
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member of the ASEAN+3 finance ministers’ process.
35 In this sense it is now a more 
inclusive arrangement, and this opens up the possibility of the participation of other 
countries. Third, Indonesia is now eligible to borrow a smaller amount (US$11.9 billion) than 
that provided by CMI BSAs (US$18 billion). This may require some additional mechanism to 
cope with possible currency turmoil and crisis in Indonesia. 
Partly to respond to the Indonesian dilemma, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
announced in May 2009 that it would begin to arrange yen-based bilateral currency swap 
lines with other Asian economies—including Indonesia—up to a total of 6 trillion yen (US$60 
billion equivalent). These arrangements are unusual in the sense that they are subject to the 
same conditionality as the CMIM and IMF link, and that the Japan MOF will raise the needed 
funds through the Foreign Exchange Special Account; it will borrow from the market by 
issuing yen-denominated short-term financing bills. It is reported that the Japan MOF will set 
up a swap line of ¥1.5 trillion (US$15 billion equivalent) with Indonesia and is preparing 
similar arrangements with the Philippines and Thailand.
36 
4.3  Lessons from Korea in the Global Financial Crisis for CMIM 
The Korean experience soon after the eruption of the global financial crisis provides 
important lessons for CMIM, as the country did not wish to use the CMI (nor the IMF). When 
hit hard by currency speculation and capital flow reversals, the country instead went to the 
US Fed for precautionary liquidity support. 
4.3.1  Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis on Korea and Policy Responses 
The Korean financial market was hit hard by the external shock following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As the global financial crisis deepened, funds flowed 
out of the country due to deleveraging by foreign financial firms. Korean financial firms, 
particularly banks with large wholesale financing requirements, faced a severe liquidity 
crunch—shrinking foreign currency supply and tight domestic currency liquidity—even 
though they had not been exposed to large subprime mortgage related instruments. 
The real economy slipped into a recession, as Korean exports shrank rapidly, owing to the 
contraction of import demand in the developed markets of the US and Europe. Korean stock 
prices had been falling since May 2008 reflecting global weakening in liquidity. Moreover, the 
Bank of Korea (BOK) had lost large amounts of foreign exchange reserves since March 
2008; the reserves declined from US$264 billion in March to just below US$200 billion in 
November. The spread of credit default swap in Korea had started to rise in late 2007, 
reaching a peak of 700 basis points in late October 2008, just days before a currency swap 
arrangement with the US Fed was arranged. The won depreciated rapidly, from 907 won per 
US dollar recorded in October 2007 to 1,483 won per US dollar in November 2008.
37 
The Korean authorities responded swiftly. The BOK eased its monetary policy aggressively, 
to soothe the financial market unrest and ward off a sharp contraction of the real economy. It 
expanded won liquidity in those sectors badly affected by the credit crunch through its open 
market operations and lending facilities, and actively provided foreign-currency liquidity to 
domestic financial institutions through, for example, the swap market, in order to stabilize the 
foreign exchange market. The government guaranteed all foreign debts in the banking sector 
                                                  
35 Hong Kong, China has been a regular participant in ASEAN+3 finance and central bank deputies’ meetings 
and other initiatives such as the ABMI, but always as part of the PRC team. 
36 Indonesia also arranged a “standby loan facility” of up to US$5.5 billion—or “deferred drawdown options—with 
Japan ($1 billion), Australia ($1 billion), the ADB ($1.5 billion), and the World Bank ($2 billion) in 2009. This 
facility would enable the Indonesian government to secure financial resources for budgetary support to cope with 
the global financial crisis. 
37 The value of the won recovered afterwards but then reached the weakest level of 1,516 won per dollar in 
February 2009. Since then the won has strengthened. 
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until 2011, and announced a fiscal expansion. When the BOK entered into a currency swap 
arrangement with the US Fed in late October 2008, in an amount of up to US$30 billion, this 
had a significant stabilizing impact on the market. 
4.3.2  Lessons from Korea 
The most important and effective measure to calm the financial panic was the currency swap 
arrangement with the US Fed. There were several success factors: First, it was a pre-
emptive measure in the sense that the US dollar liquidity support was implemented in the 
middle of the market turmoil but before it became a currency crisis. Second, the size was 
large enough to head off currency speculation. Third, it was done as part of the US Fed’s 
arrangements with multiple counties (Korea, Singapore, Brazil, and Mexico), thereby 
sending the message that Korea was not the only country that needed a commitment of 
liquidity support. 
An important fact is that Korea did not choose to go to its ASEAN+3 peers for liquidity 
support under the CMI, from which it could have obtained a maximum of US$23.5 billion. 
There were three reasons. First, if Korea had done so, it would have had to go to the IMF 
also because of the CMI requirement of an IMF link, as the amount of borrowing would have 
exceeded 20% of the CMI BSA. This would have posed a significant political problem for the 
Korean government, given the stigma associated with the “IMF crisis” in 1997-98. Second, 
opting for bilateral local-currency swap lines with the BOJ or the PBOC, which had been in 
place as part of the CMI, would not have been attractive even though the funds could have 
been drawn for precautionary purposes without the usual conditionality or link to IMF 
programs. Their size was simply too small (US$3 billion equivalent with the BOJ and US$4 
billion equivalent with the PBOC) and the yuan was (and still is) non-convertible. 
Several policy lessons can be learned from the Korean experience. For countries like Korea 
to be able to use the CMIM, its IMF link should be dismantled. Under unusually turbulent 
circumstances as in the case of Korea in the fall of 2008, CMIM support should be made 
available in a more flexible manner by (i) enabling precautionary lending rather than just 
crisis lending; (ii) delinking CMIM from IMF without requiring conditionality in a way 
comparable to the IMF’s FCL; and (iii) supplementing CMIM by additional bilateral 
contributions, involving sufficiently large amounts, from economies inside and outside the 
region to make ample resources available for potential needs in the region. These 
considerations would help those countries which would not be able to arrange currency 
swaps with the US Fed, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
4.4  Policy Challenges 
There are several key policy challenges for strengthening the regional financial architecture 
in Asia. Given the Asian countries’ aversion to requesting IMF financial assistance and their 
limited access to US dollar swap lines, it is critical that the CMIM would become usable 
without IMF-links. Essentially, the CMIM process needs to evolve into an Asian Monetary 
Fund (AMF), an independent regional financing facility. 
4.4.1  Transforming the CMIM into an AMF 
The ongoing CMIM process could eventually lead to the creation of an AMF once a strong, 
independent professional secretariat is set up and the CMIM’s IMF link is removed. So the 
key is to create conditions for IMF-delinking. Formalizing the management of CMIM is 
necessary for this purpose. A proposed “surveillance unit” that is in charge of regional 
economic surveillance and CMIM activation could become a permanent secretariat to deal 
with financial and currency crises as well as normal regional surveillance. A proposed 
“advisory panel of experts” could function as a de facto board of executive directors, making 
day-to-day decisions, discussing surveillance reports produced by the secretariat, and 
approving the amount and conditions of crisis lending. 
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To transform the CMIM into an AMF, the quality of the ERPD needs to improve so that 
lending conditionality, independent of IMF programs, can be formulated in the event of CMIM 
activation. The following recommendations should be made for this purpose: 
•  clarify rules for activating CMIM lending; 
•  establish a joint forum for finance ministers and central bank governors to intensify policy 
dialogue among them; 
•  set up a competent professional secretariat, with the required analytical expertise and 
policy experience, to enable it to support regional economic surveillance (ERPD), CMIM 
activation, and independent conditionality formulation; and 
•  improve the quality of economic surveillance by moving beyond the simple “information 
sharing” stage to a more rigorous “peer review and peer pressure” stage, and eventually 
to a “due diligence” stage.
38 
Once these conditions are met, a de facto AMF will have emerged, capable of conducting 
effective surveillance and handling regional financial crises. 
A new AMF would also be important from another perspective. It would encourage many 
Asian economies to embark on the rebalancing of growth toward domestic and regional 
demand and correcting payments imbalances. After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, 
many economies in the region saw the high value of building foreign exchange reserves as 
protection against currency crises, rather than going to the IMF. So these governments had 
every incentive to accumulate reserves by running large current account surpluses and 
intervening in the currency markets. The region’s emerging economies would welcome the 
rebalancing if an AMF could reduce financial turbulence and act as the region’s lender of last 
resort. 
4.4.2  Regulatory Challenge 
Due to the financial sector reforms initiated by the crisis-affected countries since the 1997–
1998 crisis, Asian financial systems were generally on a sound footing when the global 
financial crisis struck. Yet, there are more challenges that Asia must face in order to ensure 
financial development and stability. First, Asian economies must continue the task they 
started in 1998 to strengthen their financial systems, including raising the value and quality 
of capital, reducing NPLs, improving the balance sheets and risk management capacity of 
banks and nonbank financial firms, and subjecting financial firms to frequent stress testing. 
Second, whatever the structure of financial sector regulation and supervision a country 
adopts—that is, whether it is integrated or fragmented—national financial authorities must 
ensure that they do not allow any firm or instrument to escape the regulatory net and that 
they have the legal authority and tools to act decisively. In this context, Asian policymakers 
must emphasize macroprudential supervision to complement their microprudential regulatory 
and supervisory framework. This means that every Asian government should establish an 
effective, powerful “systemic stability regulator” to improve financial regulation and 
supervision from economy-wide perspectives. This regulator should be in charge of 
prevention, management, and resolution of systemic financial crises. 
Third, Asian countries should set up an Asian Financial Stability Board (AFSB)—an Asian 
version of the FRB—to strengthen cross-border financial supervision and regulation at the 
regional level and further Asia’s financial stability, by developing effective early warning 
systems. This forum—to be created among finance ministries, central banks, and financial 
market regulators and supervisors—could also serve to promote longer-term financial 
market deepening and integration, establish standards for governance and transparency, 
and improve investor confidence. A close working relationship should be established 
between the AFSB and an AMF. 
                                                  
38 “Due diligence” involves a rigorous scrutiny of a potential debtor economy and policies from a potential 
creditor’s perspective (Kawai and Houser 2008). 
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4.4.3  Exchange Rate Policy Coordination 
Currently no consensus exists, even within ASEAN or ASEAN+3, on a regional exchange 
rate arrangement. But, looking beyond the current global financial crisis and considering the 
rising degree of economic interdependence within East Asia through trade, investment, and 
finance, the region’s authorities need to embark on exchange rate policy coordination with 
each other. Once global financial stability begins to be restored and countries in the region 
register early recoveries and move to monetary policy tightening, one can expect the 
resumption of large capital inflows into Asia. To manage such capital inflows and maintain 
macroeconomic and financial sector stability, it will be important for the authorities to allow 
greater exchange rate flexibility vis-à-vis outside currencies—such as the US dollar and the 
euro—but this may damage a country’s international price competitiveness when its 
neighbors resist currency appreciation. Hence, the best policy option for the region is to 
allow collective currency appreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar and the euro, while keeping 
relative stability of intraregional rates, which would maintain each country’s international 
price competitiveness and spread adjustment costs across countries (Kawai 2008). Such 
collective exchange rate appreciation of the East Asian currencies would require a 
significantly coordinated approach to exchange rate regimes. 
To prepare for this type of policy coordination, emerging East Asian economies may 
consider adopting a common exchange rate regime—by managing their respective 
exchange rates with a common reference, such as a common basket of external and internal 
currencies (for example, comprising the US dollar, the euro, the pound sterling, and an Asian 
Currency Unit [ACU])—in order to avoid large misalignments and instabilities of their 
effective exchange rates and intra-regional exchange rates. An ACU is a basket of 
ASEAN+3 currencies (and possibly including the Hong Kong dollar) with appropriate 
weighting.
39 An ACU index could measure the degree of joint movement of East Asian 
currencies and the divergence of individual component currencies from the regional average, 
given by the ACU rate. Once the PRC moves to exit from its current US dollar-based regime 
and adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime, ACU movements and divergence indicators 
would provide more meaningful information. 
These efforts could help further strengthen Asian monetary cooperation. Collective 
appreciation requires at least informal policy coordination—through more effective policy 
dialogue and communication among ASEAN+3 authorities—in terms of their choice of 
exchange rate regimes. Use of an ACU index would be useful in facilitating policy dialogue 
and currency-market surveillance. This could be followed by more formal coordination of 
exchange rate policy with clearly defined rules for exchange rate parities, which could be 
defined in terms of an ACU basket, and exchange market interventions. 
                                                  
39 The ADB-led initiative of creating an ACU index in 2006 was suspended due to the Plus-3 country position that 
currency weights in an ACU index should not be decided by ADB, but at least those among the Plus-3 
countries should be decided by the countries concerned. Now that all ASEAN+3 countries and Hong Kong, 
China decided their contributions to CMIM, the ADB might use these shares as weights for the construction of 
an ACU index. These weights are not too far from those constructed based on GDP, trade, and capital account 
transactions. See Kawai (2009) for the concept of ACU, alternative currency weights, and its possible roles. 
Eichengreen (2006) provides a parallel currency approach to ACU. 
Interesting remarks were made by Adams (2006), Under Secretary for International Affairs of the US Treasury 
at the time. He stated: “With respect to an Asian Currency Unit (ACU), there has been some confusion about 
the US position on this topic. … We do not see the ACU as a competitor to the dollar. … We believe that 
greater exchange rate flexibility is desirable for the region, but are open-minded as to whether that involves 
currency cooperation within the region.” On broader regional financial cooperation, while he wanted to see 
more “clarity on the CMI” with regard to the amounts available absent IMF programs and the conditions 
imposed by CMI creditors, he stated “we … support regional cooperation that is consistent with multilateral 
frameworks.” 
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5.  THE WAY FORWARD 
It has taken two crises for the international community to seriously focus on the reform of the 
international financial architecture for crisis prevention, management, and resolution. Facing 
the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, the international community has responded in a 
proactive way, by making the G20 Summit the premier forum for international economic and 
financial cooperation, creating an inclusive, potentially powerful FSB, and augmenting the 
financial resources of the IMF. 
Although it is too early to fully assess the outcome of the recent efforts, the international 
financial architecture remains inadequate for the needs of many emerging market 
economies. The procyclicality of international capital flows has to be mitigated. The 
effectiveness of IMF surveillance should be improved—particularly that of systemically 
important economies and markets such as the US, the UK, and the eurozone. International 
liquidity support should be made available when any country with sound economic and 
financial management is put into crisis. International agreements should be reached on 
external (sovereign) debt restructuring for fair burden sharing of losses between creditors 
and debtors, and on the cross-border resolution of insolvent, internationally active financial 
firms for fair burden sharing among different countries’ authorities. 
Given the political stigma associated with the IMF interventions during the Asian financial 
crisis, many economies in Asia will not go to the IMF for liquidity support at the onset of a 
crisis. As, unlike Korea and Singapore, most Asian economies—such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand—are unlikely to be able to obtain currency swap 
lines from the US Federal Reserve, there is a need to make the CMIM more flexible and 
functional particularly in unusual turbulence like the one Korea faced in the fall of 2008. 
Considering that Asian emerging market economies do not issue reserve currencies and 
have ample incentives to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, a reform of the 
international monetary system is highly urgent. 
In addition to the G20 process, the international community needs effective and inclusive 
global governance structures to reflect the greater voice of new, rising players from the 
emerging market world. Efforts should include reforms of global financial organizations, 
incorporating the changing economic realities into their governance structures. This would 
help these economies shoulder greater responsibilities in global economic management and 
also help increase the legitimacy and credibility of the global organizations. Such global 
governance reforms would require a strong sense of responsibility on the part of major 
developed countries so that they would share the power to control such organizations more 
equitably with the rising new players. 
A well-functioning regional financial architecture could complement and strengthen the 
international financial architecture. East Asia—which achieved remarkable economic growth, 
accumulated large stocks of wealth, became the manufacturing center for the world 
economy, and is trying to rise to prime consumers of world production—needs to play a 
bigger role in global economic and financial management. By building on market-driven 
economic integration through trade, investment, and finance, East Asia can contribute to the 
healthy growth of the world economy and the stability of global finance. 
East Asia should further deepen market integration through a policy-driven creation of a 
single region-wide free trade agreement—among the countries of ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 
(which adds India, Australia, and New Zealand). To strengthen regional financial cooperation, 
the ASEAN+3 authorities should focus on: (i) the establishment of resilient national financial 
systems, including bond markets; (ii) integration of national financial markets to facilitate the 
mobilization of regional savings for regional investment in infrastructure and SMEs; and (iii) 
enhancement of regional liquidity (CMIM) and surveillance (ERPD) arrangements. To better 
manage forthcoming capital inflows and upward pressure on currency values, the region 
should intensify regional exchange rate policy coordination in order to achieve sustained 
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economic growth without creating macroeconomic and financial instability. An integrated 
Asia would be able to work with the US and the EU more effectively for the stability of global 
finance and the reduction of global imbalances. 
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